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IN THE SUPRE1\1E COURrI
OF THE STATE OF UI'AH
FERN L. BADER,
Plaintiff-Res ponrleil t,
vs.

I
\

I

\VILLIAM A. BADER,
Defendant-Appellanf,

Case No.
10691

)
1

I

BRIEF OF RESPONDEl\JT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This is an action by the plaintiff, Fern L. Bader,
against the defendant, William A. Bader, for a divorce.

DISPOSITION IN LO-\VER COURT
The respondent was granted an interlocutory
decree of divorce awarding her custody of two minor
children of the parties, subject to visitation privileges
1

for the appellant, providing for child support and distribution of the property of the parties, and awarding
her a lump sum to be paid in monthly installments by
the appellant in satisfaction of her attorney fees, arrearage in temporary support, and in lieu of alimony.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks aff irmance of the decree of
divorce as granted by the lower Court and the granting
of respondent's motion on file in this Court for attorney's fees in connection with this appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts set forth by appellant is not
entirely accurate, contains mathematical computations
based upon these inaccuracies and certain argument
and conclusions with which respondent does not agree.
Therefore, respondent presents the following:
The parties were married on December 6, 1958,
at which time respondent was employed by the Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Company in a
responsible position, (Tr. 54). The respondent continued this employment for a year and half after the
marriage, contributing all of her earnings toward the
family expenses, which earnings when she was farced
to leave her employment because of advanced pregnancy were between $80.00 and $85.00 per week, (Tr.
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At the time of the marriage she had three
children by a former marriage. One of these married
and left the home when she quit working, (Tr. 54),
and three years prior to the divorce now being reviewed
her former husband died and the remaining two children
have each been receiving $97.00 per month from Social
Security which has been applied toward the family
expenses, (Tr. 53). That these two children, "were
solely supported by the appellant during three years
of the marriage", as stated in appellant's brief, State.
ment of Facts, page 2, is nowhere supported in the
record.
54, 62).

The lower Court awarded the custody of the two
minor children to respondent with $200.00 per month
child support, and in lieu of alimony respondent was
awarded $40.00 per month for two years commencing
on January 1, 1967, to this was added $300.00 for her
attorney fees and $196.27 to be paid in the same manner, (Tr. 88).
In addition to $504.68 which appellant received
from the cash value of an insurance policy on the lives
of the four members of this family, which he awarded
himself, (Tr. 58), the appellant was given as a property
award the property as enumerated in the appellant's
Statement of Facts, page 3. His argument as to its
value, such as a 28 foot trailer house at "Oh, possibly
$400.00'', (Tr. 69), are his estimates of value and not
necessarily the lower Court's in view of the appellant's
testimony that he has been paying $65.00 a month for
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four years on the loan which was obtained to purchase
just part of this property, (Tr. 72) .
Respondent was given as a property award her
furniture which she brought to the marriage eight
years prior to the divorce and also some burial property
which she owned prior to the marriage, (Tr. 57), and
a 1960 Chevrolet upon which was owing $950.00, (Tr.
57). The Court also awarded her $935.13 in the form
of tax refund checks payable to both parties, (Tr. 77
& 80).
Respondent was ordered to assume and discharge
the $950.00 obligation of the parties due on the Chevrolet, (R. 36). Appellant, in addition to the satisfaction of the credit union indebtedness which was
incurred to purchase some of the property awarded
him, and the payments for which are made by a deduction from his gross income and not included in his
take-home pay, (R. 50), was ordered to pay obligations
of $7 45.00 of which $550.00 is the balance due for storm
doors and windows installed on the home which he
was also awarded by the Court, (Tr. 59).
Appellant's take-home net pay from American
Oil Company averages $406.40 per month, computed
by the Court from the last, or right hand, column of
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, (R ..50), by subtracting from
the total $2,243.19 the $211.16 shown for the period
ending January 2, 1966, and dividing by 5. His takehome pay from the Bar is $23.50 per week, (Tr. 68),
or $101.83 per month ($23.50 X 4-1/3). He also re-
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ceives $40.00 per month which is not taxable from the
Veterans Administration, (Tr. 69). A total of $548.23.
The remainder of appellant's Statement of Facts
consists of erroneous mathematical computations, argument and conclusions which will be discussed in respondent's brief under Argument.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE AWARD TO THE RESPONDENT
OF $935.13 IN '¥ITHHOLDING TAX REFUND CHECKS ENDORSED BY BOTH PARTIES AND HELD BY THE COURT CLERK.
In PINNEY v. PINNEY, 66 Utah 612, 245 P
329 ( 1926) this Court held: "The division of property
is a matter that rests largely within the sound discretion of the trial Court. Unless it appears from the
finding that the division made is not equitable under
all the circumstances of the case, an appellate Court
could not and will not disturb the order of the trial
Court."
Did the trial Court abuse its discretion in making
this award to respondent? In deciding this matter the
lower Court gave careful consideration to the division
which had been made of the other property.
Respondent received property which she had owned
prior to, and brought into the marriage plus a 1960
5

Chevrolet which is not valued at $950.00, the balance
due upon it.
Appellant received all of the property acquired
during the marriage. He received the home, two boats,
their two motors, a 28 foot trailer house, a 1961 Rambler Station Wagon, and four guns. In addition, he
had terminated a life insurance policy on the lives of
the four members of the family just prior to the divorce
hearing for which he received $754.68 as its cash value.
He had made the determination and had appropriated
$504.68 as his one-fourth interest in that amount.
Had respondent received these checks, they would
have helped her to survive and enabled her to pay
something toward her attorney's fees, however, they
were ordered paid into the clerk of the trial Court.

1
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POINT 2.
THE ORDER OF THE LOWER COURT
THAT APPELLANT PAY RESPONDENT
$1,456.00, PAYABLE $40.00 PER MONTH,
WITHOUT INTEREST, COMMENCING JANUARY 1, 1967.
The figure of $1,456.00 was arrived at by the lower
Court by combining $196.27 for arrearage on temporary
support, the twenty-seven cents getting lost in the process of the computation; $300.00 toward respondent's
attorney fees; and, 24 monthly payments of $40.00 in
lieu of any alimony.
6
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There should be no argument about respondent
being entitled to the arrearge in temporary support,
since there was no dispute about its being due. In fact,
good argument could be made that she was entitled
to a judgment for that amount which would draw 8%
interest if not collected by legal process or paid.
The "$300.00 towards her attorney's fees, that she
can pay the rest of it." (Tr. 78), could hardly be so
unconscionable as to require reversal, in view of the
testimony by respondent that she had been told her
attorney's fees would be $450.00, and that she felt they
were reasonable, which the record would support, since
no attorney's fees had been previously. awarded but
had been reserved until final determination of the
divorce action. Especially is this the case, since the
$300.00 was to be paid at the rate of $40.00 per month,
the payments commencing more than six months in
the future. However, on these two matters, as throughout the entire proceeding, the trial Court, in its wisdom,
saw fit to show appellant every consideration in spite
of the inconvenience caused respondent, and on the
latter issue, the distress to her counsel.
With regard to the award of $960.00 to be paid
respondent at the rate of $40.00 per month commencing January 1, 1967 (more than six months after the
granting of the decree) , is this so unreasonable and
unconscionable and such an abuse of the trial Court's
discretion as to require alteration by this appellate
Court?
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This Court early decided in REED v. REED, 28
Utah 297, 78 P. 675, (1904) that:
"The awarding of alimony and fixing the
amount thereof are questions the determination
of which rests within the sound discretion of
the trial Court; and, unless it is made to appear
that there has been an abuse of discretion on
the part of the Court in dealing with one or both
of these questions, its judgment and orders
granting and fixing the alimony will not be disturbed."
This Court has repeatedly followed and reaffirmed
this doctrine up to the presenet date. BLAIR v.
BLAIR, 40 Utah 306, 121 P. 19 (1912); ADAMSON v. ADAMSON, 55 Utah 544, 188 P. 635
(1920); and, WILSON v. 'VILSON, 5 Utah 2d 79,
296 P. 2d 977 (1956).
Respondent in this case asks the trial Court for
an award of $75.00 per month permanent alimony.
This she felt she was entitled to since, as a result of
this marriage, she has given up a life as a successful
business woman at which she earned, as appellant's
counsel has so aptly put it, "an excellent salary".
(Page 5, Appellant's Brief). Her children by her
former marriage were all of such ages as to be able
to take care of themselves to a considerable degree and
to assist their mother in numerous ways in maintaining
a home. She now finds herself with two small children,
one 3 and one 5 years of age, who require her constant
supervision and control. She is unemployed and her
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ability to earn has been reduced to temporary work
in a department store during rush seasons, (Tr. 62).
However, while acknowledging that, "and he is getting
rid of a wife cheap." (Tr. 78) , the trial Court made
no award of permanent alimony so that appellant can
in 24 convenient monthly installments of $40.00 completely shed the responsibility which he has toward
respondent. This Honorable Court's attention is called
to the fact that because of this appeal and the resultant
impounding with the clerk of the lower Court of the
tax withholding checks, respondent has had no funds
available to her for her support and has been obligated
to borrow funds for her maintenance during this appeal
which will have to be repaid.

POINT 3.
THE LOWER COURT'S ORDER FOR
CHILD
SUPPORT AND APPELLANT'S
ABILITY TO COMPLY WITH IT.
The trial Court awarded $200.00 per month for
the support of the two minor children of the parties.
At the trial and at the pretrial conference in chambers
respondent asked for this amount and at no time was
any objection made to this award. On the contrary,
appellant seemed to feel a great amount of affection
for these two children, as shown by the time spent
by the Court in arriving at visitation periods suitable
to him, and appeared to agree with the reasonableness
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of this amount for their support. The two children of
the respondent, by her former marriage, had for a
3 year period during this marriage received from the
government $97.00 each for their support. No conteution was made by appellant that this was too much
money for their support and that he was receiving any '
benefit over and above the cost of their support. No
objection to this amount of child support was made at
the trial but it is now opposed in appellant's brief to
this Honorable Court. (Although under the heading
"RELIEF SOUGHT FRO:M THE COURT", in
appellant's brief, an objection is raised, at no place in
the "ARGUMENT", is any explanation made to this
Court why the trial Court's decree on this matter should
be disturbed.)
Possibly this award for the children's support will
allow them to be housed, fed, clothed, educated, and
their medical and dental expenses paid. It will not
permit them to be reared in grandeur. Their childhood
will not be such as to permit them the luxury of two
boats each, hardly any 28 foot trailer houses, and probably their home will not be of the quality of splendor
requiring a $120.00 per month payment. However,
because of the unfortunate position in which these two
children are placed as a result of this divorce and the
broken home, it can only be hoped that each of the
parties to this appeal will do all in their power to promote their welfare.
Can appellant comply with this obligation which
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he has toward these two small children? It is submitted
that he can, and it is to be hope that he will t
Prior to the granting of this divorce defendant's
monthly take-home pay was $548.23, as explained in
the next to the last paragraph of the "STATEMENT
OF FACTS", in respondent's brief. In addition to
this amount he has an additional yearly take-home pay
of $935.13, as the result of an improper declaration,
from his withholding taxes. This amounts to an additional tax free incomeof $78.00 per month regardless
of whether appellant chooses to correct his withholding
declaration and receive it monthly or continue to use
it as a savings account and receive it annually. Under
the terms of the decree he will receive another $14.00
per month due to the decrease in his hospital insurance
withheld, (Tr. 85 and 86). These two items alone
present appellant with a net take-home pay of $640.23
each month. If it is possible for these two children to
exist on $100.00 a month each, which must pay their
medical and hospital expenses and their life insurance
premiums, all of which are already paid for appellant
by deductions from his gross earnings, (Plaintiff's
Exhibit No. 1, R. 50), surely appellant should be
able to live on the remaining net of $440.23. The respondent will not be receiving that amount with which
to support four children and herself. "The criterion
for determination of support money is the need of
the persons supported and the defendant's ability
to pay." ANDERSON v. ANDERSON, no Utah
300, 172 P. 2d 132 (1946).
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This Honorable Court's attention is called to the
fact that the respondent has received nothing for her
support and expenses since the entry of this decree and
that she has been required to retain counsel to respond
to defendant's appeal and to represent her in this Court.
Under the provisions of Sec. 30-3-3, U. C.A. ( 1953),
plaintiff should be allowed a reasonable sum with which
to pay her counsel for his appearance in this Court.
PARISH v. PARISH, 84 Utah 390, 35 P. 2d 999
(1934) and HENDRICKS v. HENDRICKS, 91
Utah 564, 65 P. 2d 642 (1937).

CONCLUSION
It is submitted that this Honorable Court has repeatedly held that the trial judge has considerable
latitude in matters of this kind and that his judgment
should not be changed lightly, and in fact, not at all,
unless it works such a manifest injustice or inequity
as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion. Nowhere in
the record does it appear that defendant and appellant
was unfairly treated, or that there was any abuse of
the discretionary power of the trial Court.

Respondent urges this Court affirm the decree
of the lower Court and award to plaintiff and respondent her costs and a reasonable attorney's fee for the use
and benefit of her counsel. (This Honorable Court's
attention is called to the Utah State Bar's Advisory
Schedule of :Minimum Fees which prescribes the fee
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of $500.00 for representing either appellant or respondent in the Supreme Court of Utah.)
Respectfully submitted,
HOWARD E. BAYSINGER
Suite 414
Walker Bank .Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Respondent
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